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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 97 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 29/05/1997 
Where it occurred: Chawni Village, Ali 
Khail District, Paktia 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?) 
Class: Tripwire accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: POMZ AP frag Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
hard 
Date record created: 24/01/2004 Date  last modified: 24/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inconsistent statements (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
vegetation clearance problem (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 





At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim's length of service was not recorded. It was two months since he had attended a 
refresher course and 31 days since his last leave. The area where the accident occurred was 
described as a hard hillside with bushes and "trees". A photograph showed a hillside with low 
bushy plants and no trees.  
The investigators determined that the victim got a detector reading and started prodding in a 
prone position. As he removed loose soil he pulled a tripwire with his hand. A POMZ six 
metres away was initiated. The device was identified as a POMZ from "found fragments". 
The Team Leader said that the victim was working properly but removed the loose soil 
carelessly. He said deminer partners should point out their errors to prevent accidents. 
The Section Leader said that the victim was working properly and the tripwire was under the 
soil and had become the colour of the ground so was impossible to see. He said deminers 
should follow rules and regulations to avoid serious accidents. 
The victim's partner said that he was working properly and the tripwire was under the 
ground, so the accident was unpreventable. 
The victim said he was working properly and the tripwire was below ground and invisible, so 
the accident was unavoidable. 
 
Conclusion 




The investigators recommended that the Team and Section Leaders should stress the need 
to use tripwire feelers properly and that extra care should be taken in bushy POMZ 
minefields. They added that the command group should pay strict attention to the use of 
tripwire feelers and that the need for tripwire feelers to be used properly should be stressed at 
the forthcoming revision course for the subject team. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 129 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: none on record Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 









See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as: superficial wounds on his forehead and a 
laceration on his right eyelid. 
A medic's sketch showed abrasions to forehead and eye.  
A casualty report noted laceration on the eyelid. No injury was shown in the photograph.  
The demining group reported that the victim sustained fragment injuries to his face and 
eyelids, but no compensation claim was on file.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the 
investigators seemed certain that the use of a tripwire feeler would have prevented the 
accident, in which case the victim was working improperly and his error went uncorrected.  
If the tripwire was indeed buried, the accident may have been unavoidable using the methods 
deployed, so the secondary cause is listed as “Unavoidable”.  
The investigators were at pains to mention that the victim was prone, but did not question the 
fact that his forehead and eye injuries imply that his visor was not worn or worn raised.  
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
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